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appraisal if the purpose of the amendment is to change the express terms
and provisions of any of the outstanding shares having preference in
dividend, redemption price, or liquidation price over any other class of
shares and implied that the express terms had been varied so as to war-
rant appraisal under said section.
It is submitted that the court was inconsistent in holding that the
stockholders might both retain the stock upon the same terms or consider
the express terms varied by the amendment so as to justify an appraisal.
Having cautiously maneuvered the amendment through the labyrinth of
the provisions pertinent to the preferred stock as heretofore set out, the
court left little doubt as to the fact that no vested interest, preferences, or
other rights of the dissenting prefered stockholders had been violated.
Thus it would seem that ipso facto no express terms could have been
varied. It is submitted that section 72 should not have been held
applicable. Perhaps the court was straining the point in order to avert
the possibility of future litigation in deference to Professor Dodd, supra,
who suggested that a literal construction of "express terms" as defined
in section 4 of the Ohio General Corporation Act would narrow the
rights of appraisal and result in much litigation. See Senate Bill 47
section 8623 (8) which reads: "The term 'express terms and provi-
sions' with reference to a class of shares means only the statements
expressed in the articles with respect thereto."
In conclusion it is significant to note that the Ohio State Bar Associa-
tion Committee on Corporation Law in its December 26, 1938 report
on proposed amendments to the General Corporation Act deemed it
necessary to include provisions specifically providing for the power to
eliminate accrued, undeclared, cumulative dividends and also for the
right of appraisal of shares where the accrued dividends on preferred
shares are eliminated by such amendment to the articles. (See Senate
Bill No. 47, 9 3rd General Assembly, Regular Session, 1939-1940).
ARTHUR E. ORLEAN
CRIMINAL LAW
CRIMINAL LAW - SPRING GUN, LIABILITY FOR USE OF
To prevent repetition of a destructive forage on his melon patch,
defendant concealed two spring guns on his land, one at each end of
the patch. One Wagoner, attempting to repeat a prior sortie, touched a
wire and received numerous body wounds. An indictment under Sec-
tion 12420 of the Ohio General Code, shooting with intent to wound,
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followed. Defendant claimed that two large signs, posted one at each
end of the field, gave adequate warning and negatived intent. Speaking
through Judge Gorman, the court said that the foreseeable consequences
and obvious intent shown by the contrivance were to injure anyone
coming on the land. Therefore, if the proof adduced brings the act of
defendant within the statute, no specific enactment prohibiting the use
of a spring gun to defend land is necessary. Childers v. State, 133 Ohio
St. 508, 14 N.E. (2d) 767 (1938).
Neither criminal nor tort liability for using a spring gun to repel a
trespass was recognized by the English common law. In 1827 Parlia-
ment enacted a statute which made it a misdemeanor to use a spring gun
except from sunset to sunrise in defense of a dwelling. (7 & 8 Geo. IV,
c. I8, repealed and substantially re-enacted in 186I, 24 & 25 Vict.,
c. 95, sec. I, & c. lOO, sec. 31). No American court has ever approved
or followed the view of the English common law in so far as it per-
mitted the use of a spring gun to protect land or its growing product or
to prevent or repel a misdeed less than a felony. One state, Wisconsin,
has adopted a statute forbidding the dmployment of a spring gun for any
purpose. Schmidt v. The State, 159 Wis. 15, 149 N.W. 388 (1914).
Only one court has ever intimated that setting up a loaded spring gun
may be per se unlawful as a nuisance. State v. Moore, 31 Conn. 479,
83 Am. Dec. 159 (1863). Perhaps the reason for this may well be
that it is the only case ever to reach a court after a spring gun had been
set up but before injury had resulted. In all others, there being an
injury, the court either justified the use or upheld a lower court convic-
tion without pausing to discuss this point. However, in so far as spring
guns are employed for the purpose of protecting land, in the light of the
uniform refusal to uphold their use, it would seem that no statute should
be necessary to classify them as nuisances.
Except for one court, supra, bound by a statute, the authorities uni-
formly agree that spring guns may be utilized only when the owner of
property, were he present in person, would be justified in employing
force sufficient to maim or kill. There is a conflict among the courts as
to when such a situation arises. Some have adopted the view that force
might be used to prevent the commission of arson, rape, robbery, burg-
lary, and homicide, stating that at early common law this was the test
for permissible use of destructive force. State v. Marfaudille, 48 Wash.
117, 92 Pac. 939 (1907). This view of the common law is question-
able. Thus, a spring gun may be used to protect a farm store room from
being broken and entered, Gray v. Coombs, 30 Ky. 478, 23 Am. Dec.
431 (1832); again, to guard a chicken coop and its inmates, with the
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added requirement that notice be given, U. S. v. Gilliam, 25 Fed. Cas.
1319, I Hayw. & H. 1O9 (1882); so, too, to prevent a felonious entry
of a public store, Schuerman v. Sharfenberg, 163 Ala. 337, 50 So. 335
(19o9). Others limit the use of such force to the defense of a dwelling.
Hooker v. Miller, 37 Iowa 613, iS Am. Rep. iS (1873), dictum;
Simpson v. The State, 59 Ala. 1, 31 Am. Rep. i (1877). So in State
v. Beckham, 306 Mo. 566, 267 S.W. 817 (1924), the owner of a
store who placed a spring gun there to prevent all too frequent burglaries,
with the resultant death of a felonious intruder, was held guilty of man-
slaughter. In Pierce v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 635, 115 S.E. 686
(1923), a conviction of murder in the second degree, where death
resulted from a spring gun to one who broke into a building not a private
dwelling, was upheld. However, "dwelling" has been interpreted to
mean more than a house wherein people live. Thus, it has been held
that a man's place of business is, to him, the same as his home and a
killing there of a burglar would be justified. Schuerman v. Sharfenberg,
supra, dictum, in refusing recovery for injuries received by a felonious
intruder from a spring gun. A chicken coop situated sixty feet from
the place of residence was held to be part of the dwelling. U. S. v.
Gilliam, supra. Two courts have said that the use of a deadly force, in
each case a spring gun, was not justified in defense of any property,
even a dwelling, unless occupied. This right can be exercised only if,
in the eyes of a reasonable man, danger is imminent to the life or limb
of the owner of the dwelling or to any of its occupants. State v. Green,
i18 S. Car. 279, 110 S.E. 145 (1921); State v. Barr, ii Wash. 481,
39 Pac. 1o8o (1895), overruled by State v. Marfaudlle, supra.
In recent years courts have displayed a tendency to consider the
preservation of human life as of greater importance than that of property.
Therefore, though conflict exists in the reported cases, it is not felt that
the question of the use of spring guns is a settled one even in those states
whose courts have had occasion to pass on it. For no one court has
decided a sufficient number of cases to be able to say that the question is
too well settled to bear re-examination. Further, no decision of the last
two and one-half decades has condoned the employment of a spring gun
for the purpose of preventing or repelling a felonious intrusion in defense
of any property other than a dwelling house.
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